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Abstract
A new framework for phenomenological psychology is proposed based on Husserl's
static and genetic methods. Static phenomenology holds a eidetic psychology centred
on the processes of noetic-noematic constitution and elaborates typologies and gen-
eral notions about human beings in connection with the world. Genetic analysis is
research into facticity, it focus on the personal history of a subject, which is constantly
in the process of becoming. When the temporal dimension of consciousness is con-
sidered, the phenomenological method becomes 'static', as it excludes the factitious
dimension of self, its personal and individual history, sedimented in layers of meaning,
which are in part pre-reflective, non-thematic and anonymous to the self, hut which
nevertheless continue to influence the experience of itself with the other and with the
world. This paper aims to present some of the fundamental principals of genetic phe-
nomenology and it's application to existential-phenomenological psychotherapy.
There are three main aspects underlying genetic-phenomenological analysis as it is
being proposed: inner time-consciousness theory, the experiential self and the theory
of passive genèses.
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Introduction
The aim of this text is to present arguments to support the central claim that
phenomenological psychology is an autonomous discipline, with its own
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defined area of intervention. It covers two broad interconnected areas, namely
static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology. In modern culture, the
terms 'static' and 'genetic' are of course high-charged. However, here they will
be used in the sense originally intended by Edmund Husserl.
There are three interconnected points that need to be made about the sub-
ject in general:
1. Static phenomenology is an eidetic psychology with its own object of
study (i.e. intentional consciousness) and a clearly-defined research
method, which includes processes of intersubjective result validation
that are duly framed by a particular epistemological approach. It thus has
direct bearing on research into classic psychology topics, like perception,
memory, language, etc., and as an eidetic psychological science, has as its
goal the definition of the invariant structures of human experience and
in this sense can be applied to a wide variety of research subjects.
2. Genetic phenomenology, on the other hand, underpins a form of psy-
chology that goes beyond the mere description of the intentional struc-
tures of consciousness. This deals with subjects such as pre-reflective and
reflective consciousness; the phenomenological notion of self; the cre-
ation of identity (the persona), constituted in an intersubjective space;
and the analysis of passive genèses and the layers of meaning sedimented
in the stream of temporal awareness. The genetic method enables us to
plunge into layers of human existence that are pre-reflective, passive and
anonymous, though nonetheless active. Genetic phenomenological anal-
ysis is research into facticity, as proposed by Husserl. It is the basis of one
form of existential phenomenological psychotherapy.
3. Between the static and genetic methods, there is constant dialectic.
Constitutive phenomenology based on eidetic dimensions (static phe-
nomenology) enables theoretical bases to be established, which are then
explored in more depth and applied using the genetic method. The
results achieved by descriptive research can be further explored after
being applied at the factical level through the genetic method. This
means the genetic investigation may question eidetic dimensions and
promote new researches at the descriptive level. Husserl maintained a
constant interrelationship between the two methods. Phenomenological
psychology aims to do the same.'
1 "These are fundamental questions conceming the distinction, but also the ordering of nec-
essary phenomenological investigations. Where they are concerned, I will always speak of
static and genetic phenomenology" (Husserl, 2001a, p. 643).
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FIGURE 1 Phenomenological Psychology: Static and Genetic Methods.
'Static' phenomenology investigates the processes of noetic-noematic consti-
tution and elaborates typologies and general notions about human beings in
connection with the world.^ It focuses upon the intentional structures of expe-
rience that form part of the human being. The noetic-noematic explorations
begun in Logical Investigations focused upon the subjective psychological acts
that objectively constitute theories, concepts, judgements, etc., and which are
formed as ideal units of meaning.^ Static research is more general and abstract
in nature and is not concerned with the existential specificity of the self and
its individual history.
Now, I can however regard the structures of the stream of lived-experi-
ence noetically-noematically in their general typicality; I can (describe)
their possible modifications, their interconnections of essence, etc.,
without pursuing the inquiry into the lawful regularity of the individual-
ity of a monad. The phenomenological-eidetic reduction places me on
the footing of a possible monad in general, but precisely not of a monad
thought individually and identically, and under the charge of circum-
scribing the individual identity according to its possibilities and neces-
sities I can doubtlessly designate phenomenological investigations as
static, investigations that attend to the correlations between constituting
2 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 629).
3 (Husserl, 1977, p. 27).
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consciousness and the constituted objectlike formations, and exclude
genetic problems altogether."*
However, according to Husserl, we can have 'a new task,'^ when this is applied
to personal individuality (Husserl used the term 'monad' to refer to the indi-
vidual human being). Thus, another function of the phenomenological proj-
ect is to consider the specificity of the monad and its personal history, which
is constantly in the process of becoming. Phenomenology is transported to a
more concrete dimension, to the level of facticity, where the object of study
becomes the self and its personal characteristics, motivations and intentions,
always limited by horizons that have been previously constituted, actively
and passively.^ Genetic investigation aims to explore the rational and affec-
tive, conscious and pre-reflective dimensions of a historical temporal aware-
ness, influenced by past sedimented meanings and by future expectations and
desires. When Husserl comes up against the depth of personal existence, he
inflects the ambit of phenomenology.
Finally, we have the phenomenology of monadic individuality, and
included in it, the phenomenology of a genesis integral to it, a genesis in
which the unity of the monad arises, in which the monad is by becom-
ing— By the phenomenology of genesis attending to original becoming
in the temporal stream, which itself is an originally constituting becom-
ing, and by attending to the so-called "motivations" that functions genet-
ically, a phenomenology of consciousness shows how consciousness
arises out of consciousness.'^
But under the rubric "monad" we have had in mind the unity of its liv-
ing becoming, of its history, but its also has its living present and it has
become in this present, and directly continues in this becoming.... This
present has its obscure backgrounds that can be illuminated, in every
Now, the present carries its history as the horizon into which it can peer.
4 (Husserl,2ooia, p. 639/640).
5 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 63g).
6 "Of particular importance, but noticed very late, is the fact that reflective, so-called 'internal,'
experience has very many levels and depth-dimensions and is exceedingly difficult to put
into practice whenever one strives to go beyond the most superficial level." (Husserl, 1977,
p. 21).
7 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 640/644).
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wbich it can run tbrougb once more and, as it were, can live tbrougb once
more in the shape of isolated or interrelated rememberings.*
Tbe dual dimension of phenomenology is nevertheless unified by a common
project. Husserl mentions the notion of the "leading clue"^ to describe tbe
constant dynamic and connection between tbe static and genetic metbods.
Tbe two metbods are mutuafly integrative and do not function exclusively
in separation. Tbat is to say, descriptive researcb tbrows up clues tbat lead
to genetic pbenomenology wben tbis is located at tbe individual level of self.
Certain eidetic knowledges, elaborated and typified, about tbe general struc-
tures of experience, may be applied to particular cases. Genetic researcb, for its
part, can also produce clues leading to static pbenomenology; by articulating
eidetic knowledge at tbe individual level, it stimulates furtber questions and
new researcb possibilities.
In a certain way, we can tberefore distinguisb "explanatory" phenome-
nology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and "descriptive" phe-
nomenology as a phenomenology of possible essential sbapes (no matter
bow tbey bave come to pass) in pure consciousness and tbeir teleologi-
cal ordering in tbe realm of possible reason under tbe beadings, "object"
and "sense". In my lectures, I did not say "descriptive", but ratber "static"
pbenomenology.'°
Due to space limitations, tbis paper bas two goals: first, to present a new
framework to pbenomenological psycbology based on Husserl's static and
genetic metbods as expressed above; secondly, aims to focus on the genetic
method and its application to psychology and psychotherapy. Tbis means tbat
tbe eidetic psycbology, wbicb is based upon static pbenomenology, will not
be considered in tbis work. Suffice it to say tbat tbe static metbod is cbarac-
terised by its attempt to describe tbe way in which objects are manifested to
consciousness and to elaborate essential structures of experience wbicb are
expressed in eidetic dimensions, general and typified. In sbort, eidetic psychol-
ogy has as its object of study the intentional consciousness; its method consider
five dimensions (the époche, the psychological phenomenological reduction;
the eidetic analysis and intersubjective modes of validating results). Tbe aims
of eidetic pbenomenological psycbology are to sbed ligbt to on tbe intentional
8 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 637).
9 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 633).
10 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 629).
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phenomena and on the meaning of human experience and the kind of out-
comes it can achieve are syntheses of meanings and eidetic results (invari-
ant structures of experience). Moreover, the section about genetic method is
highly theoretical, clarifying notions and trying to make explicitly the founda-
tional underpinnings of the genetic-phenomenological analysis.
Genetic Phenomenological Analysis: The Investigation of Facticity
The genetic method is directly connected to inner time-consciousness theory,
which Husserl began working on in 1893 and first demonstrated in his 1905
lectures. These lectures did not yet have a genetic nature, but they ultimately
proved to be the point of transition. Husserl himself considered this work to be
still formal and abstract, and it would have remained so if time consciousness
theory had not been linked to the specific existential nature of self." However,
he continued to work on time consciousness for various years, right into the
1930s, and many of the resulting manuscripts are still unpublished. The cru-
cial question is as follows: when the temporal dimension of consciousness is
considered, the phenomenological method becomes 'static', as it excludes the
factitious dimension of self, its personal and individual history, sedimented in
layers of meaning, which are in part pre-refiective, non-thematic and anony-
mous to the self, but wbich nevertheless continue to infiuence the experience
of itself with the other and with the world. For Husserl, the self is never static,
absolute and defined, but is rather situated in a living present. This means that
the self extends uninterruptedly beyond the present moment, influenced by
its past history and conditioned by its expectations (explicit or implicit) of the
future. Intentional consciousness never exists only in the present moment;
it inhabits tbe paradox which experiences its existence through a tempo-
ral flux which is simultaneously a being-here, a being-no-longer-here and a
being-not-yet-there.'2
In Ideas II, Husserl uses the terms 'monad' and 'person''^ in relation to this
facticity, a process of becoming, which constitutes time and is constituted in
time, the centre of a surrounding world. Person and world are inseparably inter-
11 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 174; Donohoe, 2004, p. 38; Steinbock, 1995, p. 40).
12 "While the static-based relation is of the order of validity, the genetic-hased order is a
temporal order of motivation. Genetic phenomenology is concerned with becoming in
the temporal stream and with the motivations that operate in that flux." (Montavont,
1999, p. 38, my translation).
13 (Husseri, 1989, p. 290).
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related. That surrounding world is not only a world in itself but also 'a world for
me'. In this work, in distinguishing the natural world from the personal world,
Husserl holds that relationships oí intentional motivations, distinct from rela-
tionships of causality, are present in the history of each person, in their rela-
tionship between the Self and the Other. The horizon is not only the analysis of
subjectivity, but above all, of intersubjectivity. The person is constituted, devel-
ops, knows himself and recognises himself through the intersubjective space.
The constitution of the world, the unveiling of self and the establishment of
intersubjectivity are inter-dependent and simultaneous processes.
The notion of motivational networks that inhabit the self will imply an
approach to Husserl's theory of passive genèses. We will be led by a phenom-
enology of association that will elaborate on the genèses of meanings created
and established throughout the life of the self, in part without its active par-
ticipation, but which nevertheless influence the possibilities of its experien-
tial horizon. Husserl's phenomenology of association also involves themes of
memory, motivational forces, the infiuence of affectivity and emotion, and that
which is known as the zero horizon or zero consciousness. As we shall see, the
genetic method plumbs the depths of facticity of existence, assuming that the
self has a cluster of abilities and characteristics, habits sedimented throughout
its experiential process, which are not immediately accessible but which pas-
sively infiuence the person's action. Each noema has a deep temporally-consti-
tuted dimension which only the genetic method can explore.'"* While the static
method is centred upon the noetic-noematic correlation, the genetic method
investigates the genesis of meaning present in any intentional unit. The whole
of lived experience points towards a temporally- and historically-constituted
meaning. Following a "principle of genetic order,"'^ it attempts to uncover the
genesis of meaning of intentional motivations, both pre-predicative and those
elaborated by reason. The process of genetic phenomenological analysis will
in part be a distillation of the sedimented layers of meaning that intersubjec-
tively constitute the subject's personality and his experiential horizons. From
that interrelational context from which human existence derives, there may
emerge confiicts, existential tensions and traumatic processes, for their part
sedimented in dissociative processes that operate at the pre-refiective level.'*»
Existential psychotherapy's work of clarification focuses upon the anguish and
dissociative processes that form part of the being-in-the-world.'''
14 (Donohoe, 2004, p. 38).
15 (Husserl, 1969, p. 208).
16 (Spinelli, 1997, p. 96; Stolorow, 2007, p. 11).
17 (Spinelli, 1997, p. 6).
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There are three main aspects to the rationale underlying genetic-phenom-
enological analysis and its application to phenomenological psychology as it
is being proposed: inner time-consciousness theory, the experiential self and
the theory of passive genèses. This theoretical structure will he framed by the
method of genetic phenomenological analysis, which will in term be comple-
mented by other concepts.
Inner Time-Consciousness Theory
The Dynamic Structure of Temporal Consciousness
Husserl considered inner time-consciousness theory to be the cornerstone of
the theoretical edifice of phenomenology.'^ It reflects and expresses the funda-
mental aim of the phenomenological project: to understand how subjectivity
can manifest itself, how it is a constituent of beings in the world and how it is
constituted to itself Husserl wondered how consciousness perceives an object
with temporal extension, such as a melody, but also asked how consciousness
is manifested to itself'^ According to him, it would he impossible to perceive
objects with temporal extension if consciousness could only apprehend the
"now" moment of the object and if the stream of consciousness were no more
than the sum of a series of unconnected "nows".^" To explain the apprehension
of temporal objects, and situations involving changes and successions, three
technical terms are used: primordial impression, retention and protention.
Let us consider a sequence of three sounds making up a melody. When the
first sound is heard (the now moment ofthe object), the primordial impres-
sion is activated. This never occurs in isolation, as that would not enable the
object's temporality to be perceived; thus, it is always accompanied by a reten-
tion (i.e. of the moment-just-passed), which allows access to the moment it
dives into the past. Simultaneously, ;9roíe«íío« is a more-or-less undefined form
that intuits the moment that is about to happen. Consciousness perceives tem-
poral objects "in blocs", in a three-part dynamic temporal structure in which
the temporal phases (past, present and future) of the object are presentified
"together" in a concentrated form. Thus, in inner time consciousness, reten-
tion and protention are not past or future in relation to the primordial impres-
sion but presented together with it. Retention and protention should, however,
be distinguished from thematic recollection and expectation. The former are
18 (Husseri, 1977, p. 154; Zahavi, 2003, p. 165; Held, 2003, p. 43).
19 (Husseri, 1994, p. 56).
20 (Zahavi, 1999, p. 63).
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passive activities that occur without any intentional action on the part of the
subject; that is to say, there is no active contribution from the consciousness.
Thematic recollection and expectation, on the other hand, are independent
intentional acts that depend at least in part upon the subject's actions, i.e. they
are voluntary.^'
The primordial impression—retention—protention structure is constantly
being updated and altered in the stream of consciousness. Each new retention
is always retention of the previous primordial impression and of the primor-
dial impression that preceded that. As time passes, objects and the experience
of them lose qualities and definition. Retentions gradually weaken until they
eventually become imperceptible.^^ The crucial question from the psychologi-
cal point of view is that the example of sound may be extended to any kind of
experience lived in thefirst-person perspective. What is given in the self in "living
flesh"^^ undergoes a transformation during the continuous retentional process
in the stream of consciousness. It is successively relegated to the past, so that
the continuous emergence of new primordial impressions occurs inseparably
from a retentional transformation.
Manifestation of Subjectivity and Temporality
For Husserl, inner time consciousness theory had a much more important aim
than merely explaining the perception of temporal objects. It had to do with the
very manifestation of subjectivity.^'' Therefore it is important to mention the
concept of double intentionality: transversal intentionality (Querintentionalität)
and longitudinal intentionality (Längsintentionalität).'^^ Let us go back to the
example of the melody. When we hear a sound, an intentional act occurs,
enabling an intentional object, different from consciousness, to manifest itself.
The act is intentional because it allows the manifestation of something differ-
ent from itself, but at the same time the act is also manifested to itself. This is
therefore a double intentionality, in which the object is given by means of the
act which, as well as manifesting the intentional object, also manifests itself.
21 "We should, then, gain nothing by transferring into ourselves the time that belongs to
things, if we repeated 'in consciousness' the mistake of defining it as a succession of
instances of nows. Yet this is what psychologists do when they try to 'explain' conscious-
ness of the past in terms of memories, and consciousness of the future in terms of the
projection of those memories ahead of us" (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 479).
22 (Husserl, 1994, p. 63; Zahavi, 2005, p. 57/58; Zahavi, 1999, p. 66; Bernet, Kem & Marbach,
1993. P-103).
23 (Husserl, 2001, p. 217).
24 (Zahavi, 1999, p. 67).
25 (Husserl, 1994, p. 107).
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From tbe last explanations, we can give tbe following response: tbere is
a single unique flow of consciousness wbicb constitutes tbe temporal
unity immanent in tbe sound, and at tbe same time, tbe very unity of tbe
flow of consciousness.^^
Tbere are two intentionalities tbat are inseparably united and intertwined,
effectively two sides of tbe same coin. Tbe intentional act and the stream of
consciousness are integral inseparable parts. '^^  Eacb retention implies a dou-
ble intentionality. The intentional act is called tbe transversal intentionality
of retention. Tbe intentionality of retentions (tbat is, tbe flow of conscious-
ness itself) is called longitudinal intentionality. Tbis is not a supplementary
retention tbat is added to tbe retention of sounds. If it were, tbis would imply
infinite regression. Tbe flow is crossed by a longitudinal intentionality tbat is
constantly in unity of coincidence with itself ^ ^ As well as being intentional
and making possible tbe manifestation of sometbing different from itself
(tbe intentional object), tbe act is cbaracterised by an "inner consciousness",
in tbe sense tbat it is manifested to itself ^ ^
Consequently, tbe flow is crossed by a longitudinal intentionality wbicb,
in tbe course of the flow, is constantly in a unity of coincidence witb
itself^"
For Zabavi, one of tbe crucial questions arising from a correct interpretation
of double intentionality is tbat Inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective
consciousness of acts of consciousness and lived experiences?^ As Sartre also
mentioned, inner time-consciousness tbeory is the most appropriate place
for understanding Husserl's explanation of tbe pre-reflective structure of
consciousness.-'^ Tbe stream of temporal awareness is tbe name given to a
pre-reflective consciousness, wbicb is not an intentional act, an internal
object or temporal unity, but ratber a basic permanent dimension of buman
consciousness.33 Experiences become tbe object for consciousness only when
26 (Husseri, 1994, p. 107).
27 (Mohanty, 2008, p. 264).
28 (Husserl, 1994, p. 106).
29 "Tile whole act is consciousness of something, but all act is also conscious" (Husserl, 1994,
p. 106).
30 (Husserl, 1994, p. 106).
31 (Zahavi, 1999, p. 71).
32 (Sartre, 1994b, p. 100).
33 (Husserl, 1989, p. 125).
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refiexivity is introduced; for Husserl, the object is at this point transcendental
in relation to consciousness, i.e., there exists a difference between the object
and intentional consciousness. Tbe flux of consciousness and intentional acts
are not two distinct flows but two different ways of manifesting a single stream.
Pre-Reflective Consciousness and Temporal Identity
It is important to remember that retentional pre-refiective consciousness is
a modification, in the sense that, when the primordial impression becomes
retention, we are not only before the object as it was given (for example, the
melody), but as it was experienced.^'* Effectively, the stream of consciousness
of retentions and protentions form a chain of experiences that transcend natu-
ral givens; they are not experienced neutrally in their crude form.^ ^ Therefore,
Husserl's theory demonstrates how all experience is constituted in temporal
awareness, a consciousness that is not thematic and which is the province
of a non-objectified self Every experience is retained in the stream of con-
sciousness, even when it is not constituted as a reflective object or instituted in
objective time, forming a backdrop that constitutes the experiential horizon.
Longitudinal intentionality anchors subjectivity, as Merleau-Ponty pointed
out; retentions and protentions are intentionalities that fasten subjectivity to
its surroundings.-^^ Tbrough time awareness, the pre-objectified self is continu-
ously and uninterruptedly lived in a multiplicity of experiences that are con-
stantly being updated in the retentional chain, while it nevertheless recognises
itself pre-reflectively as the same over time, despite the changes.
Consciousness is a stream of lived experiences, in other words, a flow-
ing manifold. But these many different types of lived experiences are
afl known to me as "my experiences". Through their all belonging to
"me", these experiences all belong togetber, and thus they form a unity.
This synthetic unity of the diversity of the stream of lived experiences is,
according to Husserl, temporality.^^
In this sense, inner-time consciousness is the primordial space for the constitu-
tion of identity. There is unity, a flow of consciousness, a self, a personality.^^
34 (Zahavi, 2003a, p. 172).
35 (Rodemeyer, 2003, p. 140).
36 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 476).
37 (Held, 2003, p. 43).
38 "The pure Ego is to emphasize it expressly, numerically one and unique with respect to
'its' stream of consciousness. If it posits in its cogito, in its experiences, a man, and in him
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Husserl's concept of inner time-consciousness is a theory about the notion of
a basic identity established in time, where the lived present is an opening, a
present in depth, ek-static, which enables the experiences of subjectivity and
the constitution of selfhood to be scrutinized. Time consciousness is the basis
of selfhood, meaning and reason.^^ The temporality of consciousness enables
the experiential world of subjectivity to be analysed.
If time is the thread with which the personal narrative is woven, it is under-
standable that the dynamic structure of temporal awareness is affected by
the presence of existential tensions and psychological disturbances. Stolorow
and his colleagues imported phenomenology to psychoanalysis and, over the
course of several decades, developed the notion of "dynamic intersubjective
fields", which presupposes a focus on affectivity in human experience and con-
siders it to be both regulated and compromised by relational systems.'^ o This
idea was always central in existential psychotherapy, which "assumes that all
refiections upon ourlivedexperience reveal that existence is relationally-derived!"*^
What Stolorow means is that the presence of emotional trauma in the human
experience seriously compromises the ek-static unity of temporal existence."*^
Traumatic experience causes the temporal awareness of the past to congeal in
the present, so that one remains captive there or returns constantly to it, while
the fiiture loses significance.'*^ The line of flux of temporal awareness col-
lapses, which means that clinical dissociation may be understood in terms of a
disorganization of personal meaning sustained by temporality.'*'* The dynamic
structure of temporal awareness will necessarily have to be considered from
the therapeutic perspective when there are dissociative processes arising out
of existential tensions and confiicts.
Experiential Selfhood
While recognising that it is reductive to work with only one notion of self
(the term is multi-faceted), Zahavi, basing himself on classical names from
a human personality, then it posits implicitly, as pertaining to him, a pure Ego with its
stream of consciousness" (Husserl, 1989, p. 117).
39 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 487).
40 (Stolorow, 2007, p. 1).
41 (Spinelli, 1997, p. 96).
42 (Stolorow, 2007, p. 20).
43 (Stolorow, 2007, p. 20).
44 (Stolorow, 2007, p. 20).
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phenomenology such as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, sug-
gests that there is an 'experiential dimension of selfhood."*^ This is a basic form
of selfhood, a core self (the 'experiential self) which precedes and underpins
the narrative self (or, if we prefer, the constitution of personal identity). The
fundamental question of the phenomenological theory of pre-reflective con-
sciousness is that, in an experiential dimension, all and any experience in a first-
person perspective immediately implies a basic awareness of self.'^^ In order to
gain access to a core self, it is necessary to investigate experiences lived in the
first person. For example, when I perceive an object, experience an emotion,
recall a past event or bring forth a thought, I simultaneously have a basic pre-
reflective awareness of myself. To be self-aware is to have first-person experi-
ences that are characterised by the quality of being mine. The basic dimension
of human existence and the constitution of self does not take place in opposi-
tion to the stream of consciousness or separately from it; on the contrary, the
core self is submerged in the experiential world, i.e. in the experiential flow
of temporal awareness. Thus, self-understanding implies an investigation into
the experiential interaction between the self and the world, which is clearly
the main aim of existential psychotherapy. The experiential self is the concep-
tual articulation of the being-in-the-world.
It is possible to identify this pre-reflective sense of mineness with a
minimal, or core, sense of self... In other words, the idea is to link an
experiential sense of self to the particular first-person givenness that
characterizes our experiential life; it is the first-personal givenness that
constitutes the mineness or ipseity of experience. One advantage of this
view is that, incidentally, it makes clear that self-awareness is not to be
understood as an awareness of an isolated, worldless self, nor is the self
located and hidden in the head. To be self-aware is not to interrupt the
experiential interactions with the world in order to turn the gaze inward;
on the contrary, self awareness is always the self-awareness of a world-
immersed self The self is present to itself to precisely and indeed only
when worldly engaged The phenomenological notion of an experien-
tial self is fully compatible with a strong emphasis on the fundamental
intentionality, or being-in-the-world, of subjectivity."*^
45 (Zahavi, 2007, p. 187; Zahavi, 2005, p. 115).
46 (Husserl, 1994, p. 105; Heidegger, 1982, p. 159; Sartre, 1994b, p. 100; Merleau-Ponty, 1945,
p. 487).
47 (Zahavi, 2005, p. 125/126).
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As Sartre points out, if I feel pleasure, I am aware of feeling pleasure; the expe-
rience of pleasure does not exist first, to which the awareness of feeling plea-
sure is later added. Pleasure is awareness of feeling pleasure. The way of being
of subjectivity is to be aware.**^ "For the law of being in the knowing subject is
to-be-conscious.'"*^ Perceiving a table is not a matter of affirming that the table
exists in itself, but that it exists for me.^° The awareness of an object is simul-
taneously a pre-reflective consciousness, a non-positional consciousness.^'
For Sartre, this basic selfhood does not yet mean self-awareness. It is neces-
sary to distinguish between pre-reflective consciousness, and reflective con-
sciousness, which is now self-knowledge.^^ We will see below that, for Husserl,
intersubjectivity is constitutional; but here what matters is the fact that any
experience lived in the first person is totally exclusive and unique.
But this unique distinctive character is clear, consisting in this, that an
all-inclusive synthesis pervades the streaming of lived experiences and
all existence synthetically constituted in them as persisting, an all inclu-
sive synthesis by means of which even unreflectedly I am constantly a
pole of identity in relation to which everything else is 'objective'.''^
Merleau-Ponty also indicated that through temporality there arises selfhood;
that is to say, consciousness always maintains a relationship of itself for itself.^
If there are qualitative differences in the way experiences are lived, there is
a quality that remains unaltered—the fact that the experiences are mine.^^
Along similar lines, Heidegger understands that the essence of Dasein lies in
the existence that is characterised by a being of mine. The Dasein is unveiled in
48 (Sartre, 1994b, p. 102).
49 Translation p. xxvii. "Gar la loi d'être du sujet connaissant, c'est d'être-conscienf (Sartre,
1943. P-17)-
50 "That is of course not sufficient to permit me to affirm that this table exists in itself—but
rather that it exists for me." (Sartre, 1969, p. xxviii).
51 (Sartre, 1943, p. 18/19).
52 "Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not
reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is
the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible " (Sartre, 1969,
p. xxix).
53 (Husserl, 1977, p. 208).
54 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 487).
55 "As something selfsame in manifold otherness, it has the character of the Self" ( Heidegger,
1962, p. 150).
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and through facticity, a being thrown into the world, with a pre-comprehension
and an intrinsic connection to himself, prior to any interpretative movement.
We are ourselves the entities to be analysed. Tbe Being of any sucb
entity is in each case mine. Because Dasein bas in each case mineness
(Jemeinigkeit), one must always use a personal pronoun wben one
address it: "I am", "you are". Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to
be in one way or anotber.^^
Experiential Self-—'Streaming' and 'Standing'
Experiences lived in tbe first-person perspective are in inner time conscious-
ness in a non-tbematic position, submerged in a borizon of potential and pos-
sibilities.^'' Tbe self of inner time consciousness is primordial and originary, as
it slips through the retentional time chain of consciousness, although remain-
ing constantly self-aware. At a deep dimension of self, streaming and standing
are one and the same inner time consciousness.^^ This gives rise to the paradox
of the person that knows himself and recognises himself as the same subjectiv-
ity over time, but wbo simultaneously identifies witb a multiplicity of different
experiences, and wbo is in constant cbange.^^ Tbis is wbat Husserl called tbe
'living present'.0° Although the self lives constantly in a chain of experiences
that go on throughout life, and cannot be identified outside tbat flow, tbe self
given in tbe first-person perspective is at the same time an invariant dimen-
sion tbat is maintained tbrougbout the multiplicity of experiences.^'
Through tbis pre-objective self-identification, my primordial ego, on tbe
one band is sometbing uncbanging, tbat is, it is standing and remaining;
on tbe otber band, tbrougb tbis pre-objective self-distancing, it is some-
tbing living and streaming, tbat is, sometbing tbat can become sometbing
different in comparison to wbat it was before. Tbus my ego, in its deepest
dimension, is a living being, wberein "standing" and "streaming" are one.^^
56 (Heidegger, 1962, p. 67).
57 (Held, 2003, p. 44).
58 (Held, 2003, p. 47).
59 "The unity of immanence is the unity of a constant flux. In the nexus of which all imma-
nent duration and change are constituted." (Husserl, 1989, p. 127).
60 (Husserl, 2003, p. 256).
61 (Zahavi, 2005, p. 132).
62 (Held, 2003, p. 47).
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At this level, it is not a matter of the subject's transparency to himself, or of
a reflective process of construction of self-knowledge.''^  The crucial aspect
is the direct connection between the phenomena experienced and the first-
person perspective, in which there already exists a primordial non-thematic
pre-objective dimension of self. Nothing can be present to the self if it is not
self-aware. The experiential self may constitute itself as a person, construct its
personal identity through language and narrative processes—above all, as we
shall see, through the intersubjective space and relational networks—but the
experiential self is a base structure of consciousness that precedes any narra-
tive dimension.^
From the psychological point of view, what is important is that the experi-
ential self cannot be understood or considered independently of its connec-
tion with the world. The self is, in first place, present in the experiential life,
intrinsically connected to the other and to the world. The experiential self, as
it is defined by phenomenologists, is similarly conceptualised in existential-
phenomenological psychotherapy, which considers an irreducihle grounding
ofrelatedness^^ as the first principle of self:
Phenomenologically influenced perspectives on the self begin by assert-
ing its indissoluble and indivisible interrelational grounding. Notbing
meaningful can be stated or experienced about 'self without an implicit
reliance upon the self's interrelational placement in the world.''''
Research into phenomenological psychology and existential psychotherapy is
centred on the interrelational dimension, for it is here that the formation and
development of self takes place, as well as (in the presence of interpersonal
blockages) psychological disturbances.
Phenomenology of Passivity: The Depths of Facticity
FoUowing Husserl, it is possible to go one step deeper to understand the mean-
ing that is present in the background of lived experiences, which always con-
tains a dimension that is veiled and obscure. Later, it will be important to
distinguish the notion of self from the concept of person (monad), a distinc-
63 (Zahavi, 2003a, p. 160).
64 (Zahavi, 2007, p. 191).
65 (Spinelli, 2007, p. 12).
66 (Spinelli, 2001, p. 41).
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tion that leads to an explanation of the intersubjective constitution of personal
identity, thus enabling closer connections to be made with psychology and
with psychotherapy. However, for Husserl, there are also intrinsic motivations
belonging to each subject, which are veiled, hidden, and are not immediately
accessible. These are what Husserl considered to be a backdrop of experiences
that the self does not immediately understand, but which nevertheless con-
tinue to "knock on the door of consciousness."^'^
These are genèses of meaning that have been established passively, without
the participation of the active self, and which have gradually formed sedimen-
tations and habits that become part of the subject's history and infiuence his
experience. Research using the genetic method acquires pertinence when the
aim is to understand not only the active self but to deal with the depth of pas-
sive experience that involves the development of the person, and his present
and future expectations. The genetic method thus makes vertical connections
between the basic self and a personal identity, and between progressive and
regressive movements of intentional motivations. It also deals with multiple
associations that occur in passive genèses in the dynamic structure of tempo-
ral consciousness, where the active self is not the main actor but nevertheless
has an infiuence.
But then genetic investigation is also necessary, the exploration of the
genèses, passive as well active, in which the monad develops and evolves,
in which, within the monad, the monadic I acquires its personal unity
and becomes a subject of a surrounding world, which is partly given to it
passively in advance, partly actively shaped by itself, and then at highest
level becomes the subject of a history.
Our starting-point was inner time consciousness theory; however, this on its
own may be formal and abstract, as Husserl himself pointed out,^ ** if it is not
directly related to the contents of facticity and the existential dimension of
subjectivity that is always imbued with personal characteristics, memory and
affectivity. It is in that connection, it is argued, that inner time-consciousness
67 (Husserl, 1989, p. 105).
68 "Time-consciousness is the primordial place of the constitution of the unity of identity or
of an objectlike formation, of all objectlike formations being given to consciousness, then
we are still only talking about that consciousness which produces a general form. Mere
form is admittedly an abstraction and thus from the very beginning the analysis of the
intentionality of time-consciousness and its accomplishment is an analysis that works on
[the level of] abstractions." (Husserl, 2001a, p. 173).
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theory and passive genèses allow phenomenology to go beyond the descrip-
tive mode to elaborate a theory of change and personal development, a theory
which is concerned ahove all with the constitution of a personality or personal
identity that can be applied to psychology and psychotherapy. See, for exam-
ple, the lectures on phenomenological psychology that he gave in Freiburg in
1925, in which he refers to passive genèses as an integral part of the constitu-
tions of personality, to the necessary connection between time consciousness
and facticity, and how the collapse of certain personal assumptions may bring
about radical changes in the subject:
As regards the psychic life of the lower passive levels, it is everywhere
the presupposition for personality."''^... Let us bear in mind that every
psychic is the unity of a streaming psychic life, and what streams in it
as psychic state or act is suhordinate to fially unique principles of this
stream-unity... However, the psyche is not just streaming life, but a life
in which, inevitably, distinctive new unities, habitualities are constituted,
that is, the passive and active abilities, abilities of perception, abilities
of feeling, abilities of memory, intellectual abilities etc. With these con-
stantly variable abilities we are already referred to the properly essential
unity helonging to every psyche, the unity of an identical I as substra-
tum for ability-characteristics pertaining specifically to an I, for personal
characteristics which are variable and in fact never resting, and which
eventually, in a collapse, can change totally; among them are the strictly
so-called character traits; the unity of mental individuality which persists
even through character changes, permeates all
There remains a question that Husserl perhaps did not respond to and which
is of particular interest to psychologists and psychotherapists. This is the
question of why the self should collapse. However, by connecting time con-
sciousness with passive genèses and with the notion that existence is intersub-
jectively derived, it is possible not only to arrive at a theory of development
and personal identity, but also to explain the existential conflicts inherent in
human experience. This will be demonstrated below.
Active and Passive Self
Already in Ideas II, Husserl refers to the free self that decides and acts, but
mentions that this active self is only one dimension of existence; a great deal of
69 (Husserl, 1977, p. 100).
70 (Husserl, 1977, p. 107).
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personal experience involves a passive self Even when the self is active, part of
it is only passively active. Husserl clearly states at various points in his oeuvre
that, even in a hidden dimension, the self is not a nothing.^' Investigating the
genèses of meaning throughout the process of personal development implies
considering the way the self is in constant contact with what Husserl caWs hyle''^
(i.e. all the sensorial givens of experience, such as 'instincts', sensations like
pleasure or pain, various types of feelings, wellbeing and illness, all of which
form part of the passive dimension of the experience of self and influences it,
even before being thematized).'''^
When dealing with the relationship between the experiential self and the
constitution of a personal identity, it will be seen that the self is the starting-
point for personal growth; despite always involving a passive dimension, it
nevertheless exerts "self-preservation",'''* and therefore does not cease to be an
active agent. The self exerts functions, develops particular competences and
has intrinsic motivations; in short, it is the centre of the faculties.''^ For Husserl,
this is only one dimension of self—that oí practical reason.''^ However, even
rational dispositions are influenced by passive moods. '^^  Thus, it is important
to highlight a crucial point: the self is constantly and simultaneously active
and passive; the sediments of ways of being and habits acquired are inter-
twined with the free will of subjectivity.^*
Therefore we find, as the originally and specifically subjective, the Ego in
the proper sense, the Ego of "freedom," the attending, considering, com-
paring, distinguishing, judging, valuing, attracted, repulsed, inclines, dis-
inclined, desiring, and willing Ego: the ego that in any sense is "active"
and takes a position. This however, is only one side. Opposed to the active
Ego stands the passive, and the Ego is always passive at the same time
whenever it is active, in the sense of being affected as well as being recep-
tive, which of course does not exclude the possibility of its being sheer
71 (Husserl, 1977, p. 155; Husserl, 1989, p. 106).
72 "Husserl calls such a genesis of egoic subjectivity a hyletic (or material) genesis. Hyle is
synonymous with passive, associative, affective, driven and habitual, and is frequently
defined as das Ichfremde, namely what is foreign to the I but deeply inhabits me: in short,
the alien within myself and inherent in me. (Depraz, 2001, p. 171).
73 (Husserl, 1989, p. 160).
74 (Husserl, 1989, p. 265).
75 (Husserl, 1989, p. 265).
76 (Husserl, 2001b, p. 102).
77 (Husserl, 1989, p. 233; Husserl, 1969, p. 207).
78 (Husserl, 1989, p. 267).
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passivity.. J^ In original genesis, tbe personal Ego is constituted not only
as a person determined by drives, from the very outset and incessantly
driven by original "instincts" and passively submitting to tbem, but also as
a higher, autonomous, freely acting Ego, in particular one guided by ratio-
nal motives, and no tone tbat is merely dragged along and unfree.... Here
habit and free motivation intertwined^
Following tbe notions of tbe active and passive self, three central aspects may
be identified with regard to Husserl's notion of passive genèses: there are active
genèses that occur with the participation of tbe self and in rational cognitive
acts; tbere is a dimension of passive genèses tbat promote a mutual influence
between tbe active and passive selves, forming a bridge between passive and
active genèses; finally, there is a dimension that is totally passive, in which
associative networks of meaning creation occur without the active participa-
tion of the self.^i The space of pure passivity is that of "primordial constitu-
tion", because tbis occurs prior to a rational and tbematic constitution on tbe
part of tbe subject.
Passive "Unconscious" Genèses
If we accompany Husserl in bis elaboration of tbe genetic metbod and its
application in tbe analysis of tbe deptb of temporal facticity, tbe active self and
passive self, we enter into tbe domain of passive genèses wbicb transport pbe-
nomenology to tbe unconscious dimension. "Tbus, our considerations con-
cern a pbenomenology of tbe so-cafled unconscious."^^ Let us look at tbis in
parts. Tbe world of passivity leads to an obscure, latent, bidden dimension tbat
is veiled from temporal awareness. Tbe point to be stressed is not to sustain
Husserl's "nil of vivacity" means tbe same of Freud's unconscious. Altbougb
Husserl referred several times to a recondite and anonymous dimension of
self, a deep part of existence tbat is not immediately accessible, be always did
so cautiously, placing tbe word in brackets, or using bedging devices sucb as
"what was then called the unconscious" so that the reader could distinguish
his own specific approach. But tbe aim bere is not to set up a dialogue between
Husserl and Freud, nor to clarify tbe differences between tbeir tbeories.^^ Tbe
aim is to make explicit tbe tbeory of Husserl's passive genèses, bow tbis directly
79 (Husserl, 1989, p. 225).
80 (Husserl, 1989, p. 267).
81 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 631; Steinbock, 1995, p. 41).
82 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 201).
83 For Freud and Husserl's dialogue on the unconscious, see Bernet, 2003.
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connects with inner time-consciousness theory and with the pre-reflective
dimension of self, and how these together may offer an important contribu-
tion to existential phenomenological psychology.
The theory of passive genèses may extend the horizons of phenomenology
and consequently to existential psychotherapy, as other authors have done
it. For example, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty have afl considered the
covert dimension of human existence. Heidegger mentioned that Dasei« is not
only ontologically distant from itself, for even at the ontic level it is hidden.^'^
Sartre claims that consciousness affects itself pre-reflectively even in bad
faitb.^5 As for Merleau-Ponty, in "Phenomenology of Perception", he connected
the aims of psychoanalysis with the phenomenological method, linking them
with the notion that "all human acts have a meaning;"*^ later, he would claim
that, although psychoanalysis and phenomenology had not followed paraflel
paths, they both pointed to the notion of latency.^'' However, an attentive read-
ing of Husserl's theory of passivity and concepts associated with it suggest that
it is closer to a psychological language of phenomenological psychology, and
therefore may be linked to existential psychotherapy.
Affective Zero-Consciousness
The primordial laws of the constitution of genèses, of their associative moti-
vational laws, originate in inner time-consciousness.^^ As we have seen, afl
retention is always retention of a lived experience. A primordial impression
occurs simultaneously with a transformation in the retentional chain and each
retention is relegated further back into the past, implying that each experience
included in a retention wifl gradually lose more of its 'force'.
Continuous retentional modification proceeds up to an essentially nec-
essary limit. That is to say: with this intentional modification there goes
hand in hand a gradual diminution of prominence; and precisely this has
its limit, at which the formerly prominent subsides into universal substra-
tum—the so-cafled "unconscious", which, far from being a phenomeno-
logical nothing, is itself a limit-mode of consciousness.^^
84 "ProximalLy the 'who' of Dasein is not only a problem ontobgicaUy; even ontically it
remains concealed." (Heidegger, 1962, p. 152).
85 (Sartre, 1943, p. 83).
86 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, p. 184).
87 (Merleau-Ponty, 1982, p. 71).
88 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 633).
89 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 217).
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Husserl describes the uninterrupted process of transformation of the reten-
tional chain as a 'clouding over' process,^^ in which all experiences that are
initially a primordial impression gradually lose their clarity, traces and salient
features, causing their affective force to diminish.^' From the psychological
point of view, it is fundamental to grasp not only the connection between lived
experiences and time consciousness, but also that the retentions that gradu-
ally lose their salience are relegated to the "nil of the vivacity of conscious-
ness," or to a space of "affective zero-consciousness". This passive dimension
of consciousness is not a nothing of psychological life; the retentions of inner
time-consciousness do not disappear. On the contrary, they form the subsoil,
the background of lived experiences, which are permanently present as an
experiential atmosphere of subjectivity.
This gradation is also what determines a certain concept of conscious-
ness and degrees of consciousness and the opposition to the unconscious
in the appropriate sense. The later designates the nil of this vivacity of
consciousness and, as will be shown, is in no way a nothing: A nothing
only with the respect to affective force and therefore with respect to
those accomplishments that presuppose precisely a positively valued
affectivity (above the zero-point) Every concrete datum of the sphere
of the living present is submerged, as we know, in the phenomenal past,
succumbs to retentional transformation and thereby necessarily leads
into the region of affective nullity into which it is incorporated and in
which it is not nothing. Thus we must reckon within the living present
in general an affective zero-horizon that is constantly varying with the
living present it
Inner time-consciousness is the place of constant genesis; the meanings cre-
ated by the self have a history. For Husserl, temporal awareness is a constant
becoming.^3 passivity is a subsoil that is being constituted throughout a per-
son's development, a space for the creation of a cluster of personality features,
of more-or-less sedimented habits, which are sometimes present in a totally
passive and obscure form, but which nevertheless play a role in the being of
90 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 217).
91 (Husserl, 1969, p. 319).
92 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 216).
93 "The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions; the stream of con-
sciousness is a stream of constant genesis, it is not a mere series, but a development, a
process of becoming" (Husserl, 2001a, p. 628).
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subjectivity. One of the main aims of genetic analysis is to explain the consti-
tution of meanings that were sedimented throughout the different phases of
development, which Husserl calls habitus, meanings that are in part not imme-
diately accessible to the self
If the monad necessarily has the form of the unity of becoming, of a
unity of unflagging genesis, then its concrete structure is only made up
of "elements" that are themselves unities of becoming, and the like the
entire monad, these unities of becoming, have an abstract structure with
the respect to their phases. Every phase has its own necessities and not
merely compossibilities; in this way, every lived-experience that is heing
"delimited" for itself demands its "background," a horizon; . . . The monad
is a living unity that bears within itself an ego as the pole of being affec-
tive and being affected, and a unity of wakeful and concealed life, a unity
of abilities, of "dispositions;" and what is concealed, "unconscious," is a
peculiar modality for the discreteness of the monad, a modality whose
necessary sense must be fashioned originally in ways peculiar to it.^ '*
In short, genetic phenomenological analysis proceeds from the assumption
that the self does not have access to all the perspectives of lived experiences.
Some are superimposed on others and some are sometimes more prominent
than others, for reasons not immediately apprehended, while others are vague
or peripheral, transformed or distorted in the retentional process, or, as we
shall see below, by associative processes. The analysis of passive genèses places
phenomenology before the deep life ofthe subjectivity.^^
Having arrived at this point, it now becomes possible to delineate a pre-
liminary contribution to the question raised above concerning the way the
self can collapse, a coflapse that may be manifested in multiple ways. In the
sphere of existential psychotherapy, Spinelli broaches the concept of world-
ing as an experiential process in which all subjectivity deals simultaneously
with the ontological dimensions of existence and with the ontic strategies of
being before the givens of existence.^'' Worlding also expresses how existence
is a continuous process and in constant becoming, existence as it is projected
outside itself. However, worlding-as-process necessarily has a structure that
fuses into a worldview; that is, the more-or-less rigid sedimentations that are
gradually established along the personal development of the self, others and
94 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 635).
95 (Steinhock, 1995, p. 42).
96 (Spinelli, 2007, p. 32).
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the world. This worldview includes the personal beliefs, self-vision, mean-
ings, behaviour, emotions and affectivity that the person has created in the
interrelational space and upon which he bases himself when dealing with his
existence. This worldview structure is complex but "attempts to maintain a
structure that places greater value upon the continuation of being rather than
upon the cessation ofbeing"^''
This assumption is directly in line with the self-preservation that Husserl
speaks of and which was mentioned above. But the connection is closer; the
worldview and worlding enunciate a basic characteristic of the experiential
self which has already been evoked here and which is present in the flow
of temporal consciousness—a streaming and a standing. As we have seen,
inner time-consciousness and passive genèses form a theory about the way
sedimentations are formed and transform into habits, some more rigid than
others, and which are constituted in the experiential self The first principle
of existential psychotherapy is that the self is grounded relatedness. For this
reason, uncertainty and existential anguish are two dimensions of human exis-
tence which arise from this presupposition, as everything that is developed is
lived in the uncertainty of the intersubjective space. Inevitably, there will be
tensions and conflicts that arise from one's own existential project, between
worlding as process and the sedimentations of the worldview. These conflicts
may result in different types of psychological manifestations and disturbances,
and, in extreme cases, with the collapse of the self; according to the existential
approach, tensions arise that are inherent to the experience of the givens of
existence.^^
Phenomenology of Association, Intentional Motivations and
Affective Allure
In order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the theory of passive
genèses, psychological concepts such as motivation, association and affective
allure need to be explored. Husserl was always clear that these concepts had
to be understood in a specifically phenomenological way, and that they should
not be confused with the meanings they are given in naturalist psychology.^^
Even before his work into passive syntheses, in Ideas II, in creating a clear dis-
tinction between the Naturalist and Personalist Worlds, he introduces the con-
cept of intentional motivation as the essential law of personal self.'"" In the
97 (Spinelli, 2007, p. 32).
98 (Yalom, 1980, p. 8).
99 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 162; Husserl, 2001b, p. 99).
100 (Husserl, 19S9, p. 231).
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world of subjectivities, of people, tbis implies intentional motivations,'"' both
intrinsic to eacb subject and intersubjectively between subjects. From the idio-
syncratic perspective, there are motivations that are veiled from self knowl-
edge, and which inclusively interconnect in "associative motivation networks."
These include sedimentations of cognitive acts, memories, and also apper-
ceptions, non-thematized pre-reflective acts, sensorial acts, therefore a whole
non-rational dimension of self.
By all means, there are hidden motivations. Even without our performing
acts of belief, they enter into motivations. Examples of it are provided
by tbe realm of experience, tbe infinitive field of motivations included
in every perception, in memory, and (modified, bowever) in every pban-
tasizing of a thing. Apprehensions of things and of thingly nexuses are
"webs of motivation".. .'°^ Here it is not a matter of a motivation of posi-
tion-takings by otber position-takings (active tbeses by active tbeses) but
of lived experiences of any sort wbatsoever. Tbese are, specifically "sedi-
ments" of earlier acts and accomplisbments of reason, or ones wbicb
emerge, in "analogy" witb tbe former, as apperceptive unities witbout
actually being formed out of acts of reason, or else tbey are completely
a-rational: sensibility, wbat imposes itself, tbe pre-given, tbe driven in tbe
spbere of passivity.'"^
Husserl considered pbenomenology of association'""* to be a continuation of
inner-time consciousness tbeory"^^ as crucial for transcendental pbenomenol-
ogy as for pbenomenological psycbology,'"*" reaffirming tbus bow associative
processes add one more important detail to tbe comprebension of motiva-
tions of facticity. Not only are associative processes transmitted between
and tbrougb previously establisbed sedimentations, tbe associative laws of
101 "All these are phenomenological relations which can be found and described only in the
purely intentional sphere" (Husserl, 1989, p. 233).
102 (Husserl, 19S9, p. 236).
103 (Husserl, 1989, p. 234).
104 "The rubric 'association' characterizes for us a form and a lawful regularity of immanent
genesis that constantly belongs to consciousness in general; but it does not characterize,
as it does for psychologists, a form of objective, psychophysical causality" (Husserl, 2001a,
p. 162).
105 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 163).
106 (Husserl, 2001b, p. 105).
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intentional motivations occur without any conscientialization of self.'°''' These
networks of associative motivations occur in progressive and regressive move-
ments, influencing each other mutually in such a way that past experiences
may flow into future expectations or present action, just as pre-reflective
expectations (protention actions) may influence sedimentations or acquired
habits.'08
Much phenomenology of association highlights the fact that associative tra-
jectories take place in the sphere of passive genèses; they are not previously
defined or reflectively elaborated upon by the self, yet nevertheless retain their
influence on it, either by remaining in the passive sphere or by articulating
influences between tbe passive and active self.'°^ Thus, a motivational associa-
tion may arise in the consciousness through an "affective allure":
By affection we understand the allure given to consciousness, the pecu-
liar pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is
a pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego; it is a
pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progress
from here..."°
Between thought and feelings, cognition and emotion, the self has various
experiences that simultaneously exert an allure upon it. Affection presupposes
a prominence, a contrast, for either cognitive or affective reasons. A lived expe-
rience produces an affection in the self, which for its part will imply a 'relief of
that same allure when the self reacts to it. However (and this is a particularly
important point from the psychological perspective), even when the self does
107 "But associations can also run their course without being noticed. Just as we fail to notice
so many different things that are in our field of consciousness, so too, we fail to notice the
connections of association" (Husserl, 2001a, p. 163).
108 "They are built through and through from intentional rays, which with their sense-
content and their filled content, refer back and forth, and they let themselves be expli-
cated in that the accomplishing subject can enter into these nexus every thing here is
'motivated,' including every new positing and every phase of the unitary total positing as
well as every new partial positing which may perhaps come to foreground but does not
have to." (Husserl, 1989, p. 236).
109 "Already mere receptivity, namely, again every 'I notice, 1 grasp, I consider' which starts
from the I center, presupposes that what is to be grasped already previously lay ungrasped
in the field of consciousness of the grasping I and exercises an affection, an attraction
upon the I, to turn attentively toward it. Thus as we see, prior to the noticing experience
there is already an unnoticing experience (...)." (Husserl, 1977, p. 100).
110 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 196).
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not direct all its attention, even when the self is not totally active in relation
to that experience, the affection may even diminish in force. As Husserl said,
there is relief in the sense that the attraction provoked a genuine effect in the
self, even when "it remains in the antechamber of the self."'"
Associative Reactivation and Passive Genèses
Finally, three aspects need to be mentioned that are cmcial for existential psy-
chotherapy. Firstly, passive genèses may be reactivated even when they have
lost affective force and are in zero consciousness. Secondly, the importance of
passive genèses does not have to do only with retentions (that is to say, with
experiences of the past); equally important is research into protentions (i.e.
passive expectations). Thirdly, all experiences lived in a particularly stream of
consciousness, in a particular self, infiuence each other mutually. This is one of
the reasons why phenomenology of association gives particular importance to
the phenomenological investigation of memory."-^ Phenomenology of associa-
tion also connects the first point mentioned (i.e. that associative processes can
provoke reactivations of experiences, even those that are occult). Husserl uses
the term 'awakening', defined as follows:
By awakening we understand and distinguish two things: awakening
something that is already given to consciousness as for itself, and the
awakening of something that is concealed.
As we have seen, in first place, the primordial impressions that become reten-
tions gradually lose prominence and are sedimented in zero consciousness.
However, what is sedimented is the original meaning of the lived experience.
Thus, an experience may be inactive in the consciousness but its meaning is
implicit and is kept present, though in an occult form. Experiences of the lived
present may reactivate retentions and passive genèses through an 'associa-
tive awakening'."3 There are many reasons why a particular retention may be
reactivated, and these may be both cognitive and rational, and emotive and
111 (Husserl, 2ooia,p. 215).
112 "Right in the midst of these facts are the phenomena that interest us: the splitting of
rememberings into rememberings. These rememberings have been muddled." (Husserl,
2001a, p. 164).
113 "Thus, an associative awakening proceeds from the present toward a retentional past that
had already arisen originally prior to this association and is fading away." (Husserl, 2001a,
p. 120).
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pre-reflective."'* What is more, the associative process does not follow previ-
ously defined routes; the reactivations may 'touch upon' different sedimenta-
tions that were not initially interconnected."^ Associative recollections, which
include the retentions upon which they are based, should be distinguished
from traditional memory. "^ This question emphasizes the existence of an
extensive horizon in the experience of self, which, passively, continues to per-
mit the elaboration of associations between past experiences, or future expec-
tations, on an implicit pre-reflective level. This hidden experiential sea, for its
part, may be reactivated, though it is not possible to anticipate how that wUl
happen or the form that it will take in particular situations that occur.
Certainly, there is an unmistakable distinction between the awakening
of the entirely submerged sphere, the distant sphere, and the awaken-
ing of empty intentions (or of their contents) that are stfll in wakeful life
or that are standing on the edge of life But first: awakening is pos-
sible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-
consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness.
We should also remember that everything that has been said about retention
(and in fact Husserl gives particular importance to the exploration of memory
networks), the laws of passive genesis and associative reactivation processes
also apply to protentions. Indeed, protention is presented as having priority
for the updating of present experience, and is the temporal foundation of
intentionality."'' It is obviously important for the psychotherapeutic process,
for as we know, the existential approach always emphasised the future dimen-
sion of lived experience and how this connects with and influences present
experiences.
The Person
We have already plumbed the depths of the passive genèses of self Now it is
time to move upwards in the direction of Husserl's notion of the person. Inner
time-consciousness, the experiential self and passive genèses form a theoreti-
114 (Husserl, 2001a, p. 227).
115 "But it is clear that awakening is not tied continuously or in leaps into the other layers
of sedimentation. ( . . . ) The awakening can jump from one sedimented layer to another,
which can be now higher, now deeper; it can jump in leaps and without any determinate
order." (Husserl, 2001a, p. 233).
116 (Drummond, 2003, p. 78).
117 (Roemeyer, 2003, p. 139).
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cal triad that is fundamental for psychological and psychotherapeutic praxis.
However, it would be incomplete if we did not consider the notion of the per-
son, the relationship between the person and the other, and how the former
is constituted intersubjectively. According to Husserl, intersubjectivity condi-
tions must be fulfilled for a person to develop beyond basic selfhood."^
As a person, I am what I am (and each person is what he is) as subject
of a surrounding world. The concepts of Ego and surrounding world are
related to another inseparably.... The surrounding world is the world
that is perceived by the person in his acts, his remembered, grasped in
thought, surmised or revealed as such and such; it is the world which is
there for it to which it relates in this or that way, e.g. by way of themati-
cally experiencing and theorizing as regards the appearing things or by
the way of feeling, evaluating, acting, shaping technically, etc And a
person is precisely a person who represents, feels, evaluates, strives, and
acts and who, in every such personal act, stands in relation to something,
to objects in his surrounding world.'^^^
Basic ipseity implies growth and development in order to achieve the pleni-
tude of a personal identity. The concept of person is phenomenologically and
ontologically dependent on the experiential self,'^° but basic selfhood, while
being a necessary condition, is not in itself enough to constitute a personal
identity; it has to be developed within a social and cultural context, with
the Other.'2'
Genetic phenomenological analysis involves describing and interpreting
meanings that have become sedimented during the course of personal devel-
opment, at its different phases, during its interaction with the family and
with social and cultural environments. It also involves describing and mak-
ing explicit expectations that are present in the associative networks of pro-
tention.'^^ In a surrounding world, the experiential self is situated as a basic
ipseity that includes sensations, associations, passive genèses, and stimuli.
118 (Husserl, 1989, p. 118).
119 (Husserl, 1989, p. 195).
120 (Zahavi, 2005, p. 129).
121 (Zahavi, 1999, p. 160).
122 "I come across theses bases also when I want to understand someone's development. I
have then to describe, going from stage to stage, the surrounding world in which he grew
up and how he was motivated by the things and people of his environment just as they
appeared to him and as he saw them. Here we touch upon facticity, in itself beyond our
comprehension" (Husserl, 1989, p. 288).
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which remain largely hidden, though they passively influence the activity of
the active self, of the person. They influence its being-in-the-world, its thought,
affectivity, bebaviour. Tbe experiential self is tbe container of tbe obscure
moods of tbe person.'^^ At tbe level of personal development, we not only con-
sider a stream of abstract consciousness, or experiences flowing in tbe reten-
tional cbain,'^'* but also tbe sedimented dispositions, traces of personality,
affectivity, tbe meaning inberent in passive and active genèses and their idio-
syncratic components as expressed through thought, the body, affectivity and
the person's behaviour. Genetic phenomenological analysis has as its object of
study tbe person, wbo bas a bistory and a unique life. From tbe psycbological
and psychotherapeutic point of view, it considers the connection between tbe
experiential self and tbe person, knowing tbat it is in the presence of a unique
subjectivity. Tbe person is tbe object of exploration, containing witbin bimself
an experiential self, tbe core of the lived experience.
There exists a continuous two-way flow between the experiential self and
the surrounding world, i.e. a bidirectional influence tbat is dynamic and con-
stant between tbe dimension of tbe self, tbe person and tbe intersubjective
space of tbe surrounding world. Tbe interconnection, biatus, contrasts, oppo-
sitions, cracks between these two worlds that are both an integral part of the
existential project result, or may result, in conflict or in the loss of adequate
self-preservation. A dramatic change in one of these dimensions, in the self
or in the world, will necessarily influence the other.'^^ However, psycbological
disturbance, and in extreme cases, tbe loss of meaning, occur in tbe intersub-
jective space and are tbe result of disruptive interrelational processes.
Tbe sedimentations wbicb are at zero consciousness may spontaneously
unleasb a reactivation in tbe self as a consequence of a confrontation between
aspects sedimented in tbe experiential self and the experiences of the sur-
rounding world. As mentioned above, in tbe process of personal development,
tbere will certainly be a place for tbe confrontation between tbe structural
dimension of self based on sedimentations and tbe process of becoming,
which is the characteristic dimension of being in tbe world. Tbere is a continu-
123 'The specifically spiritual Ego, the subject of spiritual acts, the person finds itself depen-
dent on an obscure underlying basis of traits of character, original and latent dispositions,
and thereby dependent on nature" (Husserl, 1989, p. 288).
124 "The nexus of lived experiences of a person is not a mere bundle of lived experiences or
a mere 'stream' of consciousness in which the lived experiences flow away. Instead, every
lived experience is a lived experience of an Ego, of an Ego that does not itself flow away in
a stream as its lived experiences do." (Husserl, 1989, p. 290).
125 (Stolorow, 2009, p. 407).
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ous two-way flux between the 'inner' world of the self and the 'outer' world of
the surrounding environment. A dramatic change in one of the systems influ-
ences the other. This existential tension is what I call paradoxical reversibility.
Change is an intrinsic part of the human condition. The matter has to do with
cognitive and emotional abilities and resilience that each person has, from
one moment to the next, to deal with the affective forces of the self, together
with the challenges that are raised in the interrelational space. Sartre men-
tions the restlessness that characterises the fatality of consciousness becoming
spontaneously anguished.'^^ Suddenly, sometimes for no apparent reason, the
consciousness will become anguisbed; it is as if tbat anguish were a possibil-
ity tbat is always there. At these moments, the introduction of phenomeno-
logical reduction is not a learned or intellectual operation, but rather a way of
achieving a true and authentic connection as the mode of being. The existen-
tial conflict may arise from an impact that is produced in the self as a result
of its interactions with the surrounding world, and which may unleash disso-
ciative processes.'^^ The dissociation may involve the different strategies that
the self develops in response to the challenge raised to one of the sedimented
dimensions: for example, the suppression, negation or redirecting of existen-
tial tension, which can be translated into false beliefs or behaviours that are
not in tune with an authentic way of being. In extreme situations, the conflict
may lead to the fragmentation of self, the loss or annihilation of the sense of
being a person.'^^ Tbe concept of reactivation mentioned by Husserl may be
understood in two ways from the psychological and psychotherapeutic point
of view. On the one hand, the reactivations of associative networks intertwine
sedimented meanings which, when confronted with the thematic horizon of
mundane experiences, may unleash existential anguish. On the other, that
which is defined here as reflexive reactivation is a psychotherapeutic objective,
in tbe sense that it seeks to phenomenologically investigate the constitution of
meaning in passive genèses, which in turn may only happen in the sphere of a
privileged interrelationship space.
Conclusion
Whfle the static phenomenology is wide known in psychology, the genetic
method is stifl not considered in the field. Phenomenological psychologists
126 (Sartre, 1994a, p. 81).
127 (SpineUi, 2007, p. 37).
128 (Orange, Atwood, Stolorow, 2001, p. 48).
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tend to identify their work either based on the Hussserlian descriptive
approach or on the hermeneutic work defended by others phenomenologists.
This paper aimed to present a new framework to phenomenological psychol-
ogy based on Husserl's static and genetic methods that are not to be under-
stood as two separated methodologies, although, their goals are different. The
present text, besides presenting the new framework, has focused above all
on the theoretical underpinnings of genetic phenomenology, which require
subsequent adaptation and integration into the praxis of phenomenological
psychology and existential psychotherapy. However, we identified a triad that
sustains the genetic theory as proposed: inner time-consciousness, the expe-
riential self and the theory of passive genesis. Future work will seek to show
how the relationship between static and genetic methods may have a specific
application to the field of research. In the specific case of genetic phenomenol-
ogy, other concepts must be developed and presented and, in particular, must
be submitted clinical cases with a reading based on genetic analysis.
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